Game Theory
Code
2185
Academic unit
null
Department
null
Credits
3,5
Teacher in charge
Alexander Coutts
Teaching language
English
Objectives
This course presents, at a medium level, the concepts and tools for the analysis of situations where decision problems of various actors are interdependent, and some actors possess more information than others. Typical issues involve the analysis of actors beliefs over time and the strategic use of information.
The focus of the course is on a simple but rigorous treatment of the theoretical foundations and equilibrium concepts. Many applications to economics and management are discussed. Time permitting, basic notions of cooperative game theory and supermodular games will also be introduced. Contents: Refreshment: Strategic form games and Nash equilibrium, extensive form games and subgame‐perfect Nash equilibrium; Bayesian games and Bayes‐Nash equilibrium; Dynamic games, Bayesian‐perfect equilibrium and sequential equilibrium; Screening, signalling, mechanism design and auctions; Cooperative game theory; Supermodular games.
Prerequisites
N/A
Subject matter
Strategic form games and Nash equilibrium, extensive form games and subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium; Bayesian games and Bayes-Nash equilibrium; Dynamic games, Bayesian-perfect equilibrium and sequential equilibrium; Screening, signalling, mechanism design and auctions; Cooperative game theory.
Bibliography
Martin J. Osborne (2003), An Introduction to Game Theory, Oxford University Press.
Martin J. Osborne and Ariel Rubinstein, A Course in Game Theory, MIT Press. RESOURCES.
Slides and other material will be distributed through Moodle.
Teaching method
In a half-semester course the students will be offered lectures which contain both exposition of the theory and immediate applications. Students will prepare classes with assigned readings, do two take-home problem sets, and answer weekly online quizzes. Students will be able to discuss course content in Moodle forums.
Evaluation method
-Final exam 50% (minimum grade 9.0)
-2 problem sets 30%
-In-class participation 15%
-Online quizzes 5%.